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Abstract
Introduction This paper suggests and tests a reason why
the public might support the funding of services for rare
diseases (SRDs) when the services are effective but not
cost effective, i.e. when more health could be produced by
allocating funds to other services. It is postulated that the
fairness of funding a service is influenced by a comparison
of the average patient benefit with the average cost to those
who share the cost.
Methods Survey respondents were asked to allocate a
budget between cost-effective services that had a small
effect upon a large number of relatively well patients and
SRDs that benefited a small number of severely ill patients
but were not cost effective because of their high cost.
Results Part of the budget was always allocated to the
SRDs. The budget share rose with the number sharing the
cost.
Discussion Sharing per se appears to characterise prefer-
ences. This has been obscured in studies that focus upon
cost per patient rather than cost per person sharing the cost.
Key Points for Decision Makers
Public support is found for some funding of effective
but cost-ineffective services for rare diseases
(SRDs).
Funding SRDs is feasible because of their low total
and per person cost.
Funding SRDs subject to a budget constraint
redistributes resources from low- to high-severity
conditions.
1 Introduction
The theory of economic evaluation commonly commences
with the assumption that, all else equal, the social objective
of the health sector is the maximisation of quality-adjusted
life-years (QALYs). With a fixed budget, this is achieved
by selecting services with the lowest cost per QALY.
However, it is widely recognised that the simple ‘QALY
model’ may omit important considerations, with a recent
review of the field concluding that ‘‘the recognition that
CEA [cost-effectiveness analyses] cannot readily accom-
modate every concern … has led nearly every group that
recommends the use of CEA … also to recommend that
decisions… should take into account important factors that
are not embedded in the analysis’’ [1]. Similarly, Drum-
mond et al. [2] noted that ‘‘economic evaluation does not
usually incorporate the importance of the distribution of
costs and consequences … which may be an important
factor in assessing the social desirability of a service or
program’’.
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In response to these concerns, there has been a growing
literature that focuses upon the variables omitted from the
‘QALY model’. A number of reviews of this literature now
exist [3–7]. Variables identified as important include, inter
alia, the severity of untreated illness, patient age and a
lifetime ‘fair innings’. More recently, the significance of
‘rarity’ has become a controversial issue because of the
rapid expansion of services for ‘orphan disorders’, which are
defined in the USA and EU legislation as disorders with a
prevalence of fewer than 200,000 individuals (USA) and
fewer than 5 per 10,000 of the population (EU) [8]. A
number of countries have adopted policies to support market
access to these services [9], and it has been argued that the
current evaluation framework should accommodate the
preferences revealed by these policies [9–14]. However, the
majority of writers have argued that rarity per se should not
be a relevant consideration: health is maximised by the
selection of cost-effective services irrespective of their rarity
[15–21]. Survey evidence [15, 17, 22–24] indicates no
preference for services for rare diseases (SRDs) when the
choice is between ‘rare and common diseases’ [16].
Nevertheless, a limited number of studies have observed
a public preference for allocating some part of a limited
budget to services that are efficacious but not ‘cost effec-
tive’ because of their high cost [25–30]. In one of these
studies, members of focus groups explained their choice in
terms of the preservation of hope [29], an explanation also
suggested by Nord et al. [25].
The present paper adds to this literature and suggests
and tests an additional reason why the public might support
the funding of SRDs. The study hypothesis is that people’s
evaluation of fairness is influenced by a comparison of the
benefit to a patient with the average cost to a person who
shares the cost. With small patient numbers, SRDs imply a
small total cost and therefore a small average cost to those
bearing the cost. If this is sufficiently small relative to the
patient’s benefit, provision of the SRD may be seen as
equitable. The key test of this ‘sharing’ hypothesis, pre-
sented below, is that, as the numbers sharing the cost rise
and the average effect upon those bearing the cost falls,
support for the funding of SRDs will rise.
An analogy to the hypothesised reasoning occurs when a
sailor is lost at sea and the cost of a successful rescue is
low, say $5.00 per person. It is likely the majority would
vote for the payment. If they were advised that the rescue
required $5.00 from 1 million people and that the rescue
was not cost effective, the study hypothesis suggests that
people would still vote for a compulsory $5.00 levy. The
choice between a person’s life and (a possibly involuntary)
$5.00 per person levy may appear ethically unambiguous.
Two surveys are reported below that test the ‘sharing’
hypothesis and three subsidiary hypotheses. These are that
as the price of the high-cost service rises (1) funds per
service will fall: ‘normal substitution’; (2) the budget share
will fall: ‘weak sharing’; and (3) the budget share will rise:
‘strong sharing’.
Section 2 describes the surveys, and results are pre-
sented in Sect. 3. The discussion in Sect. 4 includes, inter
alia, a consideration of the arguments that funding SRDs
would be infeasible because of their large numbers and
ethically unacceptable as it would reduce total health.
2 Methods
In sum, respondents to an Australian web-based survey
were asked to divide a budget between a small group of
patients with a high-cost illness (A) and a large number of
patients with a low-cost illness (B). Treatments were
divisible, and the quality of life of both groups of patients
rose with the funds allocated to them. The difference in
treatment costs ensured that expenditures upon illness B
were always more cost effective. The symptoms of the two
illnesses were identical and were evaluated separately to
allow an estimate of the net QALY loss from expenditure
upon illness A. The number of patients B, and the cost of
illness A, were varied. The study hypotheses were tested by
observation of the allocation of resources to illness A.
Regression analyses were conducted to determine the
importance of the variables that explained the budgetary
allocation to illness A.
2.1 Surveys
Two web-based surveys were administered by a talking
avatar to members of the public who were enrolled with a
panel company, CINT Pty Ltd. Participants were selected
at random from their age–sex cohort until a predetermined
quota was filled, which was calculated to obtain a repre-
sentative profile of the age–sex composition of the Aus-
tralian population. Both surveys were divided into three
parts. First, questions were asked to familiarise respondents
with relevant health states that were then evaluated on a
visual analogue scale (VAS). The second and major part of
the survey asked respondents to divide the available budget
between the small number of high-cost patients (A) and the
large number of low-cost patients (B) as the relative cost of
treatment, the number of low-cost patients and the total
budget varied. In the final part, the agreement/disagreement
questions were asked to gain insight into people’s reasons
for their previous answers.
2.1.1 Part 1
Respondents were asked to rank four health states relating
to walking and self-care. Using terminology from the
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descriptive system of the EuroQoL Five-Dimensions Five-
Levels (EQ-5D-5L), levels of disability were described as
‘slight’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’ and ‘unable to walk and self-
care’. An explanation of a VAS was provided (reproduced
in Appendix 1 in the Electronic Supplementary Material
[ESM]), and participants were asked to rate the four health
states using the VAS. Scores were converted into time
trade-off (TTO) utilities using a transformation described
in the ESM (Appendix 2).
2.1.2 Part 2
The second part of the survey was introduced by the avatar
as follows:
Suppose you live in a small town of 1000 people …
next year, two illnesses will occur … illness A and
illness B. Both illnesses have the same symptoms
which are problems with mobility and self-care. Five
people will get illness A and 100 people will get
illness B. Anyone in the town … may get one of the
illnesses. You, personally, could be one of these
people.
… without treatment patients will die. With some
treatment patients will be saved from death but left
with problems with walking and self-care such as
dressing, washing and toileting. The more treatment
the patient receives the more their health will be
improved until the illness is cured. The effect of the
treatment… lasts 10 years after which it will have to
be repeated.
Because the causes of the illnesses are very different,
the cost of treatment for the two illnesses is very
different … the government has allocated a fixed
budget … which is not enough to provide a full cure
for everyone. Extra private spending is not possible
and no other services will cure the illness. The
questions are about how you think the government
should distribute its money.
Respondents were then presented with a series of fig-
ures that summarised the parameters of the choices they
were to make (see Box 1). The descriptions of health states
in these figures were aligned with the percentage of cost
coverage, the numerical value of which equalled 100 times
the utility of the health states. These were obtained from an
earlier study that had used the same scale and descriptors
[31]. Therefore, in selecting a level of cost coverage,
respondents were selecting the health state utility that
would be experienced by patients if they contracted the
illness.
The avatar continued:
Using the slider you can choose how to divide the
money between the two illnesses and therefore how
much health to create for each group of patients …
which is represented by the size of the blue areas.
Moving the handle all the way to the right creates the
maximum total amount of health as shown by the large
blue area. This is because illness B is cheaper to cure
so you can buy the most units of health if you spend all
of the funds on illness B. But if you do this the five
patients with illness A will get nothing and they all die.
Moving the handle all the way to the left creates the
minimum total amount of health… This is because
illness A is more expensive to cure so you’re buying
less units of health when you spend on illness A. When
you do this (survey 1 continued) 100 patients with
illness B get nothing and they all die. (Survey 2 con-
tinued) The 600 patients with illness B get less health.
The budget, the cost of cure and the number of patients
B in the two surveys were varied as shown in Table 1. The
number of patients A remained unchanged at five; patients
B varied from 100 to 600. The cost of illness B was
unchanged at $1000; for illness A it varied from $2000 to
$20,000. The budget changed with the number of patients.
To mitigate order effects, the scenarios were administered
in reverse order in the two surveys. The visual represen-
tation of the health of patients B expanded and contracted
to scale with the number of patients. Possible combinations
of health were calculated by an algorithm that altered the
(blue) visual display of the total health of both groups as
the respondent moved the slider.
Box 1 Visual aid for budget allocation
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After several introductory tasks described in the ESM
(Appendix 6), respondents were asked to allocate the
budget in each scenario. However, before an answer was
accepted, respondents were asked to respond to the fol-
lowing statement about their choice:
Notice that you are reducing total health so that
health can be shared. Please confirm this is what you
think should be done. Are you sure you want the
XXX patients with illness B to have only XX % of
full health so that the 5 patients with illness A can
live and have X % of full health?
The figures XXX, XX and X were inserted by the
algorithm. The allocation to A, foregone expenditure on B
and therefore foregone QALYs were calculated for each of
the scenarios in Table 1.
Regression analyses were used to investigate factors
associated with the decision of budget allocation. The
dependent variable in each regression was the percent
cover of the cost of illness A. Independent variables
included the price of treating illness A, the number of
patients with illness B, the total budget to be allocated
and respondents’ demographic characteristics, including
sex and a set of age dummies. The ordinary least squares
(OLS) method was used. Considering that each respon-
dent answered 15 questions, a fixed-effects (FE) esti-
mator was further adopted. Cluster robust standard errors
were reported. Regression analyses were conducted
using Stata version 13.1 (StataCorp LP; College Station,
TX, USA).
2.1.3 Part 3
Respondents were asked to use a Likert scale to rate the
importance of six possible influences upon their budget al-
locations and to agree/disagree with three reasons for the
provision/non-provision of high-cost services.
Two edit criteria were used to remove results that
indicated a misunderstanding of questions or serious
inconsistency. These are described in the ESM (Appendix
4), which also reports a comparison of key results esti-
mated with both edited and unedited data.
The survey was approved by the Monash University
Human Research Ethics Committee; approval ID: CF15/
411–2015000201.
3 Results
A total of 702 respondents completed the questionnaire:
353 in survey 1 and 349 in survey 2. Of these, 38% failed
one of the two edit criteria, leaving the sample of 432,
comprising 221 in survey 1 and 211 in survey 2. From
ESM Appendix 4, the percentage edited was lower in the
age range 18–24 years but similar in other age–sex cohorts.
The key result—variation in the allocation to patients A—
did not vary significantly with the use of edited and une-
dited data. Demographic characteristics of the edited
sample are reported in Table 2. The sample closely
resembles the demographic structure of the Australian
public, which is reported in the final row of the table.
VAS scores for the two sets of health states and the
estimated TTO utilities are reported in Table 3. For the top
two states—slight and moderate problems—the average
VAS scores were 4 and 3 percentage points lower than
those obtained in the earlier survey [31], which were
incorporated in the figures. The lower health state utilities
were identical to the earlier estimates.
The percentages of the full cost of care allocated to
patients A and B in the two surveys are given in Table 4. In
each scenario, there was a significant allocation of
resources to services for illness A despite this lowering
total health. Increasing the number of patients B, who
shared the opportunity cost of services for A, increased the
coverage of illness A in all but two cases. The exceptions
occurred in survey 2 when there were 300 patients B and
the cost of A was $2000 and $5000. The result may be
explained by the reduction in the budget in survey 2.
However, an order effect may have been a contributory
factor.
Results in Table 4 indicate that the order of presentation
of questions had a small but significant effect. When there
were 100 patients, identical questions were asked but in
reverse order. When PA = $2000, survey 1 respondents
Table 1 Survey parameters
Both surveys Survey 1 Survey 2
Number of patients Cost of cure
Group A Group B A $000 B $000 Order delivered Budget ($000) Order Budget ($000)
5 100 20, 15, 10, 5, 2 1.00 1 100 3 100
5 300 20, 15, 10, 5, 2 1.00 2 300 2 250
5 600 20, 15, 10, 5, 2 1.00 3 600 1 500
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Table 2 Demographics—percentages
Age groups, years Educational level Totals
18–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 C65 Total High school Dip/Trade/TAFE Uni n
Survey 1
Male 9.4 14.0 21.5 21.5 15.9 17.7 100 27.1 29.9 43.0 107
Female 15.8 13.1 15.8 21.1 18.4 15.8 100 19.3 43.0 37.7 114
Total 12.7 13.6 18.5 21.3 17.2 16.7 100 23.1 36.7 40.2 221
Survey 2
Male 14.4 17.1 21.6 16.2 12.7 18.0 100 23.4 19.8 56.8 111
Female 20.0 12.0 17.0 22.0 11.0 18.0 100 22.0 29.0 49.0 100
Total 17.1 14.7 19.4 19.0 11.9 18.0 100 22.7 24.2 53.1 211
Total
Male 11.9 15.6 21.6 18.8 14.2 17.9 100 25.2 24.8 50.0 218
Female 17.8 12.6 16.4 21.5 14.9 16.8 100 20.5 36.5 43.0 214
Total 14.8 14.1 19.0 20.1 14.6 17.4 100 22.9 30.6 46.5 432
Australiaa
Total 11.0 19.3 18.2 17.5 15.0 19.0 100
Data are presented as percentages
TAFE Technical and Further Education
a Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics [38]
Table 3 Visual analogue scale
and estimated time trade-off
utilities
Health state TTO meana VAS meana SD Max Min
Slight problems with walking and self-care 0.90 0.76 0.12 1.00 0.30
Moderate problems with walking and self-care 0.77 0.59 0.12 0.95 0.20
Severe problems with walking and self-care 0.61 0.44 0.12 0.96 0.10
Unable to walk and self-care 0.29 0.19 0.12 0.85 0.0
ESM electronic supplementary material, SD standard deviation, TTO time trade-off, VAS visual analogue
scale
a (1–TTO) = (1–VAS)1.62 Source: Appendix 2 in the ESM
b The 100-point results from the 100-point scale (Box 2, Appendix 2 in the ESM) were divided by 100





% of full cost given to A Max–
Min
% of full cost given to B Max–
Min
Price A Price A
2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000
1 100(1) 100 78.3 68 43.7 34.2 25.6 52.7 92.2 86.4 78.1 74.4 74.4 17.8
2 100(1) 100 82.6 68.2 51 41.1 34.5 48.1 91.7 82.9 74.5 69.2 65.5 26.2
1 300 300 87.6 78.6 67.1 59.4 52.3 35.3 97.1 93.5 88.8 85.1 82.6 14.5
2 300 250 74.5 63.9 56.6 49.3 45.2 29.3 80.8 78 73.9 71 68.2 12.6
1 600 600 89 83.9 75.6 69.6 63.5 25.5 98.5 96.5 93.7 91.3 89.4 9.1
2 600 500 79.1 71 63.8 59.1 50.7 28.4 82.2 80.3 78.2 75.9 74.8 7.4
1 n(600)/n(100) 1.14 1.23 1.76 2.04 2.28 1.07 1.12 1.2 1.23 1.2
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gave 78.3% cost coverage to patients A—4.3% less than
respondents in the second survey. The difference increased
to 8.9% when PA = $20,000. Differences are significant at
the 1% level.
In survey 2, the ‘start point’ was the most dire scenario
for patients A: PA = $20,000. This may have created a
greater willingness to impose costs upon patients B, an
embedding effect that may explain the lower share allo-
cated to B when budgets were equal (n = 100).
Consistent with the first subsidiary hypothesis—‘normal
substitution’—the tenfold increase in the price of A led to a
reduced cover of between 66% (survey 1; 100 patients B)
and 36% (survey 2; 600 patients B). Figure 1a, b plot the
average percentage coverage of A against its price. To
highlight the order effect, results from survey 2 for 100
patients B are also shown in Fig. 1.
Figure 2a, b plot the percentage of the total budget al-
located to patients A as the price rises. The corresponding
data are reported in Table 5 along with the opportunity
cost, which is imposed upon patients B, measured as the
percentage reduction in cost cover per patient. Over the
range of observations, the results are inconsistent with the
second but consistent with the third subsidiary hypothesis.
Increasing price is associated with ‘strong sharing’—an
increasing, not decreasing, percentage of the budget allo-
cated to A.
Table 6 reports the QALY loss from each scenario. The
reduced budget in survey 2 (B = 300, 600) is associated
with a very significant increase in the net loss, reflecting
the greater opportunity cost imposed upon B to maintain
sharing in these cases. The same table reports the QALY
loss as a percentage of the potential QALYs: the QALYs
that would be obtained by following the QALY-maximis-
ing strategy of allocating all resources to illness B. As the
cost of A rises, QALYs sacrificed to maintain sharing
increases.
3.1 Regression Results
Table 7 reports the results of regression analyses in which
the percent coverage of the cost of A is the dependent
variable. The virtually identical results obtained using OLS
and FE techniques implies that the unobserved individual
characteristics had no significant effect upon results.
Coefficients upon price A and the number of patients B was
stable and highly significant regardless of whether or not
the total budget was controlled. The coefficient on price A
in columns 1–4 implies that across the full dataset an
increase in the price from $2000 to $20,000 reduced cost
coverage of A by an average of 36%. The positive sign on
the quadratic term suggests that the rising price of A has a
diminishing effect: as the coverage of A falls there is an










































Fig. 1 Percent coverage of total cost of illness A by price A and size
of group B. a Survey 1, n = 100, 300, 600; survey 2 n = 100.
b Survey 2, n = 100, 250, 500. Asterisk Percent of the total cost of A








































Fig. 2 Percent of budget allocated to patients A as price varies.
a Survey 1. b Survey 2. Asterisk Percent of budget A allocated to
patients A
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% Budget allocated to patients A Max–
Min




Price A Price A
2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000
1 100 100 7.8 13.6 21.9 25.6 25.6 17.8 7.8 13.6 21.9 25.6 25.6 3.28
2 100 100 8.3 17.1 25.5 30.8 34.5 26.2 8.3 17.1 25.5 30.8 34.5 4.15
1 300 300 2.9 6.5 11.2 14.9 17.4 14.5 2.9 6.5 11.2 14.9 17.4 2.00
2 300 250 3.0 6.4 11.3 14.8 18.1 15.1 19.2 22.0 26.1 29.0 31.8 1.66
1 600 600 1.5 3.5 6.3 8.7 10.6 9.1 1.5 3.5 6.3 8.7 10.6 7.1
2 600 500 1.6 3.6 6.4 8.9 10.1 8.6 17.8 19.7 21.8 24.1 25.2 1.42
a In all cases the full price of B was $1000. In four of the six cases, the budget is 1000 times the number of patients B, n(B). (Survey 1, n = 100,
300, 600; Survey 2, n = 100). In these cases, the opportunity cost per patient B, measured as a percentage reduction in utility, is numerically
equal to the percent of the budget allocated to A
Table 6 Net quality-adjusted life-year loss per annum
Survey Number of patients B QALY Loss Percent possible QALYs lost
Price A Price A
2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000 Number of patients B 2000 5000 10,000 15,000 20,000
1 100 –4.1 –10.2 –19.8 –19.9 –24.3 100 4.1 10.2 19.8 19.9 24.3
2 100 –4.2 –13.7 –23.0 –28.7 –32.7 100 4.2 13.7 23.0 28.7 32.7
1 300 –4.3 –15.6 –30.2 –41.7 –49.6 300 1.4 5.2 10.1 13.9 10.9
2 300 –53.6 –62.8 –75.5 –84.5 –92.8 300 21.4 25.1 30.2 33.8 37.2
1 600 –4.6 –16.8 –34.0 –48.7 –60.4 600 0.8 2.8 5.6 8.1 15.5
2 600 –104.0 –114.1 –128.8 –141.6 –148.1 600 20.8 22.8 25.8 28.3 29.6
Table 7 Regression results: dependent variable: percent cover of cost of illness A
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Price A –2.006 [0.056]** –2.006 [0.056]** –2.006 [0.056]** –2.006 [0.056]** –3.479 [0.162]** –3.479 [0.162]**
Price A2 0.067 [0.006]** 0.067 [0.006]**
No. of patients B 0.035 [0.002]** 0.035 [0.002]** 0.032 [0.002]** 0.033 [0.002]** 0.032 [0.002]** 0.033 [0.002]**
Total budget 1.945 [0.187]** 1.771 [0.171]** 1.945 [0.187]** 1.771 [0.171]**
Age 18–24 4.667 [2.544] 4.769 [2.522] 4.769 [2.522]
Age 25–34 1.668 [2.545] 1.712 [2.535] 1.712 [2.535]
Age 35–44 2.259 [2.655] 2.294 [2.640] 2.294 [2.640]
Age 55–64 1.948 [2.840] 1.886 [2.830] 1.886 [2.830]
Age 65? 0.469 [2.772] 0.513 [2.761] 0.513 [2.761]
Male –3.259 [1.557]* –3.217 [1.551]* –3.217 [1.551]*
R2 0.30 0.29 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
Observations 6480 6480 6480 6480 6480 6480
FE fixed-effects, OLS ordinary least squares
Cluster robust standard errors reported in brackets
Time-invariant characteristics (age and sex) were excluded from FE estimates. A constant was included in the model
** p\ 0.01, * p\ 0.05
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5–6). The coefficient of 0.035 for the number of patients B
implies an average increase in coverage of 21% as the
number rises from 100 to 600. Both results are consistent
with tabulated average effects reported in Table 4. With
regard to respondents’ demographic characteristics, on
average, males allocated significantly less than females to
patients A. No significant association was found among
different age groups.
3.2 Rating Questions
Results from the rating questions reported in the ESM
(Appendix 5) are summarised in Fig. 3. There was strong
support for the coverage of high-cost illnesses (question
1) and disagreement with their low coverage (question 2).
Three considerations were nominated as most important
as decisions were being made, namely, the avoidance of
terrible health states, fairness in the distribution of health
and the amount of total health (questions 5, 6, 9).
Preservation of hope received the second-lowest support
(question 8).
4 Discussion
Consistent with earlier studies, survey participants divided
a fixed budget between high- and low-cost services but,
unique to this study, the allocation was shown to be sen-
sitive to the level of sharing and this occurred with full
knowledge of the consequences of decisions for total
health. Respondents were asked to confirm their under-
standing of this after each question. A large majority
agreed that it is ‘OK to reduce services to the majority by a
little to cover the cost of very expensive services needed by
the few people with rare illnesses’ and that ‘if services for
severe illnesses are very costly, the cost should be shared
across the whole community’. The opportunity of creating
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Fig. 3 Net agreement with and importance of allocative criteria.
Agreement statements: (1) it is OK to reduce services to the majority
by a little to cover the cost of very expensive services needed by the
few people with rare diseases. (2) It is (not)* ok to provide the few
patients requiring very expensive services with only basic low cost
care even if they are left in poor health because Medicare has a
limited budget and can’t pay for everything. [*‘not’ inserted here to
unify interpretation of Fig. 3]. (3) The severity of illness, rather than
the cost of treatment, should determine priority. If services for severe
illnesses are very costly the cost should be shared across the whole
community. Importance while allocating the budget: (4) The health of
patients in Group A. (5) The total amount of health (the area shaded
blue). (6) Fairness in the distribution of health. (7) The loss of health
in Group B by giving money to Group A. (8) Preserving hope for
Group A. (9) Avoiding terrible health states. Source: Electronic
Supplementary Material, Tables A.5.1, A5.2
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therefore expressed verbally, visually and as an abstract
principle. Therefore, results could not be attributed to a
misunderstanding of the opportunity cost.
The effects found in the survey were quantitatively
large. The price of A was raised to 20 times the price of B,
but this increased sharing to the point where a maximum of
37% of possible QALYs were foregone to maintain ser-
vices to the high-cost patients. This was associated with a
reduced coverage of the high-cost service, but the reduction
depended upon the relative number of patients sharing the
cost. From Table 4 the tenfold increase in cost in survey 1
reduced coverage of A by 52 and 25 percentage points
when the numbers of patients B were 20 and 120 times
greater than A, respectively.
The striking discrepancy between these results and those
cited earlier [15–17, 21, 22] may be attributed to differ-
ences in the survey design. In previous surveys, when rarity
per se is the focus it is difficult to see reasons for priori-
tising SRDs above cost-effective services. In contrast, the
present study focus was first upon a consequence of rarity,
namely the low total cost and therefore the low cost per
person affected by funding an SRD. The analogy of a
rescue for a sailor lost at sea was used (not to evoke the
rule of rescue) to illustrate the moral force of saving
someone’s life when the cost to any person is only $5
because of the sharing of costs. Second, in previous studies
the opportunity cost of the treatment of one person with a
rare disease was the non-treatment of one or more patients
with a common disease. Sharing was not possible because
of the experimental design. The main hypothesis of the
present study was that, given the opportunity, people have
a preference for sharing, albeit with the size of the share
varying in the usual way with other relevant variables.
A possible limitation with the present design is that,
without the SRD, patient A would die, whereas many SRDs
are for non-fatal conditions and results could differ when a
patient does not face death. However, the present design
permitted respondents to save patient A’s life, leave them
in a serious health state and allocate the residual budget to
the cost-effective service, B; that is, the present design
required a choice between the (further) treatment of a non-
fatal but severe outcome and the maximisation of health
with the residual budget. However, up to 80% of the cost of
A’s treatment was covered, implying that sharing does not
only occur to save life.
Results are subject to a number of methodological
caveats. First, a significant proportion of respondents to
web-based surveys provide careless answers. However,
from Appendix 4 in the ESM, editing did not alter the main
conclusions: their inclusion did not change the effect of
price and patient numbers upon sharing. Deleted cases
primarily added ‘noise’. Second, individuals who enrol
with a panel company are self-selected. But there are no
evident reasons for believing that people interested in panel
surveys would allocate health resources differently from
others. Third, despite provision of comprehensive verbal
and visual information, questions were cognitively
demanding and responses would be affected by partici-
pant’s use of simplifying heuristics although there was no
evidence of the choice aversion found by Dragojlovic et al.
[23]. Nevertheless, the significance of framing effects and
other potential causes of bias can only be determined by
further studies employing alternative methodologies.
Despite the present results, funding SRDs may seem
infeasible. In the EU, almost 7000 diseases have been
identified that affect fewer than 5 people per 10,000 [32],
and their funding may appear to be prohibitively expensive.
Challenging this view, at least one projection based upon
orphan drug designation in the Eurozone countries con-
cluded that ‘‘fears of unsustainable cost escalation do not
appear to be justified’’ [33]. However, such projections
reflect an assumed level of coverage of SRDs, and results
reported here suggest that this should be greater than at
present. But the results do not imply full coverage of all
SRDs, and as the average cost imposed on other patients
rose, the preferred coverage of SRD patients would fall.
This implies that, despite the large number of SRDs, the
criteria for obtaining budget support could be revised to
expand the scope of sharing without an increase in the total
budget. Various criteria for rationing are possible that take
account of patient numbers and therefore total cost. One
example is given below.
Patient numbers and sharing may be included in the
criteria by a simple extension of the present CEA criterion
summarised in Eq. 1.
Cost=QALY T ð1Þ
Cost per QALY must be less than a threshold, T, which
may be selected to achieve a target budget. The algorithm
may be adjusted to Eq. 2 to take account of sharing and
severity.
Cost=QALYwT
w ¼ f Sev; N; Shareð Þ ð2Þ
where w is a weight that is a function of the disease
severity, Sev is the number of patients N who have the
diseases or the sum of the numbers with a rare disease of
equivalent severity and the proportion of the eligible pop-
ulation sharing the cost, ‘share’. As severity increases,
w will decline: as N increases and the opportunity cost of
service provision increases, w will rise; as sharing increa-
ses w will fall. An algorithm satisfying these conditions is
illustrated in the ESM (Appendix 3). With universal shar-
ing, this generates values of w, which vary from 0.05
(imminent death affecting 0.001% of the population) to 2.7
(initial utility, 0.8, affecting 10% of the population). The
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data are artefactual but illustrate the possibility of accom-
modating payment for SRDs subject to a budget cap.
Finally, the results might be seen to imply horizontal
inequity between patients who would receive treatment if
their illness were rare and costly but not if the illness were
common and cheap. However, the survey results do not
imply this conclusion as the groups affected were not
‘horizontal’. Costs were the result of an incremental
reduction from full health, for the larger group, B. The
benefit A was an improvement from death or from very
poor health. Results imply less than maximum possible
utility. However, population preferences need not conform
with consequentialist utilitarianism, which is the only
ethical theory that simply aggregates utilities. All other
theories take account of the distribution of utilities in a way
that reduces their aggregate value. Population preferences
may be ‘laundered’, but the case for this is strongest when
preferences are abhorrent or ill informed. The present
results are in neither of these categories. They reflect a
concern for others; they are consistent with defensible
‘communitarian’ values and with the significant ethical
literature that argues for prioritising the worst-off members
of society [34–37].
5 Conclusions
A willingness to share is a fundamental characteristic of a
communal enterprise. However, at present, the sharing of
costs has no part in the theory of economic evaluation.
Evidence from the present survey suggests that when
patient numbers are small and the average cost to those
who share the cost is small, a well-informed public is likely
to support the funding or part funding of effective services
that are not presently considered ‘cost effective’ because of
their high cost per patient. Constructing an algorithm for
allocating the health budget that incorporates these pref-
erences is problematic, but this cannot be taken as evidence
that public preferences are unaffected by sharing. In gen-
eral terms, sharing implies the substitution of a small
number of high-cost services for severe health states for a
larger number of services for less severe problems. This is
an achievable policy.
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